By Mohammad El Sahily | Staff Writer

Lebanese oppositional politics have been in a state of paralysis recently, with some groups grinding to a halt almost immediately in the aftermath of the parliamentary elections last May. After the successful election of thirteen “change” candidates into the Lebanese parliament, oppositional groups have either tried to accommodate their transition into “real” politics or have simply become unable to operate from the margins of the political scene. There are many reasons for this state of paralysis, and there seems to be no room for improvement or activation of progressive political fronts whether in the streets or in the professional guilds. 

The October 17 uprising was a spontaneous manifestation of popular dissatisfaction and frustration with the Lebanese status quo. Over the next two months, people would take to the streets demanding political, economic, and social reform. There have been similar protest movements, the latest being the “You Stink” protests in 2015 which protested the garbage crisis in Beirut and the main cities of the country. Without any mobilization, hundreds of thousands in every major Lebanese city conducted sit-ins, closed roads, and built tents where popular demands were discussed and future protests were planned. There seemed to be an “air” of nationwide hope and change. 

In the years preceding the October uprising, there were several organized political collectives ranging from parties to networks, which were openly opposing the Lebanese political system and calling for demands such as reforming the banking sector, promoting secular personal status laws, LGBT and women’s rights, and integrating refugees. Some political collectives were also concerned with the youth and the state of education in the country given the increasing sidelining of the Lebanese University. These collectives, regardless of their focus, gradually came to lead the protest movements which began in October 2019 and started conceiving alternatives for the system. 

COVID-19 first entered Lebanon in February 2020, and subsequently, the government enforced a lockdown on public spaces and areas. This, combined with the snowballing economic crisis which was exacerbated by the banks’ holding of people’s deposits, created a situation whereby people were only concerned with their livelihood, health, and well-being, paying no attention to political activism and protest calls. Nowadays, this remains an obstacle to popular political mobilizations similar to October 2019. The August 4 explosion, which killed hundreds and destroyed Beirut, was a breaking point for many Lebanese people who now believed that political change was impossible in Lebanon. 

The results of the May 15 parliamentary elections breathed some life into a beleaguered opposition. After months of campaigning with minimal resources, thirteen new “opposition” parliament members won. They were initially called “change MPs” by the media and were subjected to increasing scrutiny. Their tenure in parliament has been quite difficult, as they faced internal splits (notably from members like Waddah Sadek) and strong pushback from government (“sulta”) blocs. The MPs’ inability to enact any significant or concrete reforms and

their recent entanglement with the establishment regarding presidential elections has caused even greater popular dissatisfaction with oppositional politics in general. 

The confluence of bureaucratic stagnation and socioeconomic collapse has placed all reformist political initiatives under deep strain and brought on paralysis to all these parties. Nowadays, there is a general feeling that the regime has managed to recreate itself and acclimatize to the new reality in Lebanese society. Protests nowadays are extremely rare and sparsely attended, and disillusionment is the common denominator of the Lebanese condition. Reflection and reassessment are imperative: genuine political awareness has been created by the October uprising, and opposition groups need to capitalize on that to become more effective and transformative political actors against the “sulta”.